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Abstract
There is growing interest in contact tracing apps (CT apps) for pandemic management. It is crucial to consider ethical 
requirements before, while, and after implementing such apps. In this paper, we illustrate the complexity and multiplicity 
of the ethical considerations by presenting an ethical framework for a responsible design and implementation of CT apps. 
Using this framework as a starting point, we briefly highlight the interconnection of social and political contexts, available 
measures of pandemic management, and a multi-layer assessment of CT apps. We will discuss some trade-offs that arise 
from this perspective. We then suggest that public trust is of major importance for population uptake of contact tracing apps. 
Hasty, ill-prepared or badly communicated implementations of CT apps will likely undermine public trust, and as such, risk 
impeding general effectiveness.
Keywords Contact tracing apps · Covid-19 · Public trust · Public health · Health apps · mHealth
Introduction: the rise of digital contact 
tracing
Digital technologies are increasingly being discussed and 
implemented for Covid-19 pandemic management and as 
tools for easing restrictive measures, such as lockdowns 
(Mello and Wang 2020; Ting et al. 2020). Due to the high 
penetration rate of smartphones, there has been a huge 
interest in mobile phone data as a source for public health 
research and measures (Oliver et al. 2020). To track the 
spread of the virus, in Europe and elsewhere, network oper-
ators share (anonymized and aggregated) phone location 
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data. Apple and Google, two leading providers of smart-
phone operating systems, release data to show mobility 
trends in countries and selected regions (Apple; Google 
2020). In addition, a range of new mobile phone based 
applications (“apps”), sometimes lumped together under 
the term “COVID-19 apps”, have been rolled out recently 
or are being under development by private as well as public 
actors (Sharma and Bashir 2020; Privacy International 2020; 
Woodhams 2020; GDPRhub 2020).
These apps may serve a variety of functions: provide 
users with Covid-19-related information, monitor people 
in quarantine, trace movements, or give users rapid warn-
ing of potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 (GDPRhub 2020; 
Rimpiläinen et al. 2020). Frequently, mobile phone apps are 
designed to fulfil more than just one purpose, e.g. symptom 
checkers could generate data which might also be used for 
epidemiological modelling, monitoring the virus spread or 
to evaluate public health measures. Available apps differ 
widely regarding data use (e.g. self-reported, geolocation 
data, proximity tracing), data sources (e.g. GPS, Bluetooth), 
data handling (decentralized or centralized), as well as data 
protection (anonymization or pseudonymization) (Wood-
hams 2020).
Proximity or contact tracing apps (CT apps) have gained 
notable attention so far. CT apps notify users if they have 
been in proximity to confirmed infected people and propose 
next steps (e.g. self-isolation, testing). A vital distinction 
to be made here is between apps that collect data on—in 
principle—identifiable individuals in a centralised data-
base (‘centralised’ variants) and those that function by use 
of encrypted identifiers that connect individual users to each 
other (‘decentralised’ variants). Only the first allows ‘contact 
tracing’ in the stricter sense when individuals and encoun-
ters are retrospectively identified by a third party. The sec-
ond variant warns users in the case of contact with infected 
individuals (i.e. exposure notification), but does not allow a 
centralized tracing of possible infection chains. Both vari-
ants, contact tracing and exposure notification, can play an 
important role in a digitally supported pandemic manage-
ment strategy.
Since analogous contact tracing is comparatively slow, 
resource intense and lacks reliability, digital proximity trac-
ing has been proposed as a complementary tool to indicate 
possible transmission chains that analogous contact trac-
ing might miss or take a longer time to identify. One study 
suggests that CT apps could, in theory, effectively decrease 
virus transmission by enabling targeted testing or quarantine, 
and thus avoid mass confinements or lockdowns (Ferretti 
et al. 2020). Informing or identifying potential spreaders 
earlier could reduce pre-symptomatic transmission, i.e. 
before an infected person shows symptoms. This might also 
support micromanagement after lifting restrictive pandemic 
control measures or during future infection waves. Until 
today, however, little is known about the effectiveness and 
efficiency of CT apps in real-world settings, and whether 
or not they could also have negative effects on pandemic 
management, or expose individuals to ethical downsides, 
such as lack of data protection.
As of August 2020, a wide range of CT apps is being used 
or under development globally, from Algeria to Vietnam 
(Howell O’Neill et al. 2020). Singapore pioneered a Blue-
tooth based open-source technology named Bluetrace, which 
underpins the TraceTogether app (TraceTogether 2020). In 
Europe, after a joint attempt to establish a pan-European 
“privacy-preserving approach” for CT (PEPP-PT) has seem-
ingly failed, various countries have rolled out their own 
proximity tracing apps. Initially, PEPP-PT and a centralized 
database were considered as the preferred framework for CT 
apps, but massive criticism (e.g. Joint Statement 2020) has 
led some policy makers to switch to a decentralised approach 
(Busvine and Rinke 2020). However, European countries are 
divided on the question whether to rely on centralized (e.g. 
France) or decentralized (e.g. Germany) data management, 
making interoperability between different frameworks dif-
ficult. By now, the authorities of many European countries 
like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ireland 
and Switzerland opted for a decentralised approach based 
on a joint API from Apple and Google (Howell O’Neill et al. 
2020). There are plans from the European Commission to 
build a gateway to allow cross-border exchange of informa-
tion between these national CT apps.
Development of CT apps is not only promoted by pub-
lic agencies but often relies on public–private partnerships 
with relevant corporate actors. Notably, Apple and Google 
have collaborated to develop a joint contact tracing frame-
work which is also founded on decentralized data manage-
ment (Apple and Google 2020). Such efforts are important 
to guarantee interoperability between different smartphone 
systems and allow building efficient CT apps. However, due 
to this dependency, commercial companies are gaining a 
wide-ranging influence on the national strategies for digital 
contract tracing; e.g. the Apple and Google framework is 
only of limited use for countries which have opted for a 
centralized architecture for CT apps like France (Scott et al. 
2020). Furthermore, the use of the framework is restricted 
to only one tracing app per country (Gurman and De Vynck 
2020).
CT apps may prove to be valuable public health tools, 
but they also raise significant concerns (Gasser et al. 2020; 
Lucivero et al. 2020). As part of the Covid-19 pandemic 
response, advisory bodies, NGOs, and expert initiatives have 
interrogated the ethical aspects of digital surveillance tech-
nologies, including CT apps (e.g. AlgorithmWatch 2020; 
Amnesty International et al. 2020; Chaos Computer Club 
2020; Human Rights Watch 2020; Swiss National Advisory 
Commission on Biomedical Ethics 2020; WHO 2020). 
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The first ethical frameworks for digital tools in the context 
of Covid-19 have been proposed (Mello and Wang 2020; 
Gasser et al. 2020; Lucivero et al. 2020; Kahn et al. 2020; 
Morley et al. 2020; Parker et al. 2020), and the European 
Commission (2020) has drafted various recommendations 
and guidelines for digital contact tracing in the EU.
This paper focuses on ethical considerations for respon-
sible development, design and implementation of effective 
and justifiable CT apps in pandemic management strategies. 
It considers legal and digital ethical concerns in a broader 
framework of public health ethics as well as related prag-
matic and procedural considerations. It provides a frame-
work for ethical analysis of concrete proposals, and suggests 
that to strengthen trustworthiness, policy makers need to be 
sensitive to the multi-faceted complexities of public health 
decision making.
Ethical framework for decision‑making 
on the use of CT apps
The viability of CT apps as a useful pandemic-response 
measure, depends on a complex interplay of criteria, such 
as pragmatic assumptions about effectiveness, the likelihood 
of public health benefit, technological specifications, legal 
requirements etc. To minimise the risk of adverse outcomes, 
ethical standards should guide and complement the process 
of development (ethics by design), implementation, use, and 
evaluation of CT apps. Rather than asking general questions 
on the moral acceptability of CT apps, the crucial question 
is: “What specific interventions, if any, may be justified 
under what conditions?” Inspired by ethical frameworks for 
big data in health and research, developed by the SHAPES 
initiative (Xafis et al. 2020), and other normative frame-
works for digital health technologies (Marckmann 2020) and 
pandemic management (Thompson et al. 2006), we propose 
relevant substantive values (which evaluate the outcome of 
measures) and procedural values (which guide decision-
making) as well as corresponding questions, which should 
be considered in response to these requirements (Table 1).
The list of considerations provides a sketch of the com-
plex set of criteria relevant to assessing CT apps as ethically 
justifiable public health tools. We neither claim that the list 
is complete, nor do we think that a responsible policy-mak-
ing process should necessarily address all of them. On the 
contrary, it is highly unlikely that a solution would satisfy 
all these demands. Not only is there a significant lack of 
available data and real-world experience regarding CT tech-
nologies, all pandemic management strategies will involve 
several trade-offs. But acknowledging the ethical values and 
specific questions can help during development, implemen-
tation and evaluation of CT apps in order to find ethically 
appropriate solutions. In what follows, we will describe 
some of the complexities in implementing CT apps (cf. 
Nijsingh et al. 2020).
The landscape of justifying CT apps
Considering the wide variety of mobile applications being 
developed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is 
crucial to distinguish between different apps, their functions, 
purposes, and performance. The value of mobile applica-
tions being developed in the context of the Covid 19 pan-
demic essentially depends on specific pandemic contexts 
and factors such as the social and political environment, 
how CT apps are integrated into a comprehensive strategy 
of pandemic management, as well as possible and available 
alternatives (Fig. 1).
Notably, and as we will demonstrate, the implementa-
tion of digital contact tracing may involve moral costs. In 
some countries, apps and other mobile based surveillance 
measures are imposed on people, leading to an infringement 
of privacy rights (Human Rights Watch 2020). Even with-
out compulsion, CT apps can have severe consequences for 
social values: worries range from issues of data protection, 
to possible stigmatization of patients, social justice con-
cerns, or function creep (Woodhams 2020; Hart et al. 2020).
Nevertheless, risks that cannot be easily mitigated or 
avoided could still be acceptable, considering the severity 
of a pandemic situation, the importance of effective contact 
tracing to manage it, and the scope of established measures 
to stop virus transmission. To assess whether a certain CT 
app is justified, its use needs to be compared to available 
alternative strategies. From this perspective, infringements 
associated with a possible loss of privacy and risks related 
to an effective CT app may appear justifiable in light of the 
enormous costs in terms of welfare, liberty and health out-
comes of either letting the virus run its course or maintain-
ing comprehensive restrictions or lockdowns (Schaefer and 
Ballantyne 2020).
To make a case in favour of a CT app, however, several 
conditions must be met. Sufficient societal need and poten-
tial effectiveness need to be demonstrated, and ethical risks 
sufficiently mitigated in order to demonstrate proportional-
ity. In addition, such evaluation and decision-making needs 
to demonstrate procedural fairness, with transparency and 
opportunity for potentially concerned parties to voice con-
cerns. Finally, the balance of reasons for and against needs 
to be superior to alternative solutions or strategies. Here, 
again, context matters. For a CT app scheme to be worth its 
costs and risks, a society needs to be in a pandemic stage, in 
which contact tracing is a priority. This may depend both on 
the pattern of (community) transmission, and the healthcare 
capacity of this country relative to the transmission pattern. 
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Table 1  Ethical framework for CT apps: substantive and procedural values
Substantive values Guiding questions
Public health benefit Is the pandemic situation such that contact tracing activity is motivated from a public health standpoint?
Is the general use of the CT app likely to enhance the effectiveness of contact tracing measures?
Is the technological make-up of the app such that it can actually produce public health benefit?
Is the pool of potential users who are willing to use a CT app large enough for epidemiological effectiveness?
Harm minimisation Are CT apps the least harmful way of obtaining the desired benefits?
Are CT apps easy to use and do they minimise confusion or stress by design?
Has the risk of self- and social stigma effects, implicated by an elevated focus on one’s or others’ health status been 
considered and mitigated?
Are safeguards in place to mitigate the vulnerability of and harm to marginalized groups from CT apps and related 
public health and security measures?
Are potential, harmful social effects related to the app (widespread anxiety, ineffective quarantines etc.) adequately 
considered?
Privacy Are measures in place for data protection and against data loss or misuse?Are data security authorities involved?
Is data parsimony guaranteed and access to non-essential personal data minimised?
Are the most privacy-preserving solutions (e.g. no real-time data, anonymization) prioritised?
Is collection of the tracing-data temporary (e.g. will it be deleted after a certain, specified amount of time)?
Is data sharing for other purposes excluded?
Are appropriate cyber-resilience measures in place?
Justice Has accessibility and availability been maximised
Are benefits and burdens of CT apps equally distributed among the population?
Will discrimination of vulnerable and structurally disadvantaged population groups be prevente?
Are there measures to safely include marginalized groups or ‘digital immigrants’, without exacerbating their vulner-
ability?
Will resulting scientific knowledge and insights be freely shared for the public good?
Are different levels of digital literacy considered in app design?
Liberty/autonomy Are users informed about possible consequences of CT app use?
Are CT apps used voluntarily?
Is there proper user consent for data use?
Are users able to withdraw consent?
Are there measures to avoid de-facto mandatory use, e.g. by restricting access to public or work space with CT apps?
Are CT apps the least liberty-compromising measures compared to alternative strategies to pandemic management?
Are there alternatives for those who choose not to participate in CT apps?
Solidarity Are there measures to avoid negative effects on solidarity, e.g. by not imposing overly disproportionate burdens on 
specific groups?
Has consideration been given to whether negative attitudes towards people who do not use the app may feed into 
practices of victim blaming?
Stewardship Are effects of CT apps on existing infrastructure considered (e.g. encourage or strengthen power asymmetries, or 
market monopolies)?
Are safeguards against function creep, i.e. the use beyond the purpose of the technology, in place?
Are there strategies against malicious, fake CT apps?
Are measures and policies reversible?
Are CT apps embedded in robust regulatory frameworks?
Are safeguards and oversight mechanisms in place?
Are strategies in place to limit duration and end measures (sunset provisions)?
Procedural values Guiding questions
Transparency Are technological solutions and frameworks sufficiently transparent (e.g. open source)?
Are purposes, objectives, as well as limitations of CT apps and measures clearly named and communicated?
Are actors and possible stakes behind the CT apps transparent?
Can CT apps be subject to an audit?
Proportionality Are social, and moral costs of CT apps proportionate to the pandemic threat and the expected effectiveness of using the 
app?
Is the cost-effectiveness of the CT app positive compared to alternative pandemic management strategies?
Are financial costs proportionate to the expected public health benefits?
General trustworthiness Are democratic procedures in place to guide decision making?
Can population uptake be assumed?
Do stated objectives of CT apps align with proposed measures?
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If a society is not in such a state, no app will be able to pro-
mote better contact tracing.
In addition, the utility of CT apps largely depends on 
broader public health measures beyond digital technolo-
gies. For CT apps to contribute to an effective public health 
strategy, sufficient staffing of public health services as well 
as reliable infrastructures (e.g. for testing and for quaran-
tine) are needed. To avoid false positive self-reports, health 
departments or other institutions need to confirm infection 
status of users. For ‘centralised’ CT apps, the data generated 
by the app needs to be collected and analysed in a meaning-
ful and cost-effective way (from a public health perspective) 
in relation to a set of justified effective tracing actions that 
are thereby being facilitated (i.e. eased or made possible by 
the app data). For ‘decentralised’ apps, additional efforts of 
analogous contact tracing are necessary, because possible 
transmission chains are not tracked in a way to be accessible 
for health authorities. All CT apps require well-organised 
institutional efforts.
Enhancing effectiveness
Little is known about the effectiveness of contact tracing 
apps in the real-world setting (Anderson 2020). Even for 
countries with a high penetration rate of proximity tracing 
technologies such as Iceland, the contribution of CT apps 
to suppressing the pandemic has been questioned (Johnson 
2020). Besides the risks of false positives (which can impose 
burden on unaffected individuals) and false negatives (which 
may lead to a false sense of security), the implementation 
of an ineffective app has opportunity costs: wasting time 
and resources, undercutting other solutions and leading to 
wrong political decisions. This may result in a sub-optimal 
Table 1  (continued)
Procedural values Guiding questions
Reasonableness Is the proposed solution epidemiologically sound?
Are the underlying considerations and models scientifically valid?
Is there sufficient evidence that the CT app meets technical standards of reliance?
Is the pandemic situation of a stage that makes contact tracing a priority from a public health standpoint?
Is the app embedded in and of added value to a robust public health strategy with sufficient resources to test, trace and 
treat?
Accountability Is it clear who can be held to account in the case of adverse outcomes, such as harm, infringements of rights or lack of 
effectiveness?
Is there oversight of CT apps by legitimate governmental agencies and independent oversight bodies?
Consistency Are CT measures and policies based on the same legal and ethical standards as other accepted measures of pandemic 
management?
Are policies consistent with legal frameworks?
Do strategies fit with local or national demands for pandemic management?
Engagement Are there possibilities for the broader public to participate in decision making?
Has input from relevant stakeholders (e.g. public authorities, health departments) been considered?
Reflexivity Are there alternative strategies of contract tracing prepared if CT apps turn out to be inefficient and are there strategies 
in place to reverse decisions?
Have the potential effects of CT apps on data monopolies be considered in decision making
Are there research initiatives in place to evaluate the efficiency of CT apps?
Fig. 1  Layers of assessment: To 
assess CT apps, the interplay 
between technological aspects 
and socio-political contexts 
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approach to pandemic control, leading to higher morbidity 
and mortality and greater economic damage.
It is also crucial to view the value of a CT app in regards 
to the quality of information produced by it: Mobile phones 
are not well equipped for contact tracing of individuals. 
Bluetooth signals, which are central for the now widely 
used approach supported by Apple and Google, only allow 
a rough estimation between devices (Leith and Farrell 2020). 
The same is true if location data (GPS) is used. Apps that 
would rely on user-generated subjective information are also 
likely to produce false predictions that could affect particu-
lar tracing policies. This concerns both false positives and 
false negatives. As such, incorrect information will rather 
compromise than support particular public health measures, 
as well as health care systems more generally, and scarce 
resources may be wasted, or used suboptimally.
By contrast, CT apps that appear to be effective in trac-
ing individuals, may raise more severe privacy concerns 
(Baumgärtner et al. 2020). It has been reported from South 
Korea, where multi-source tracing and tracking technologies 
are being used (GDPRhub 2020), that information was so 
detailed as to allow re-identification of individuals (Zastrow 
2020). Hence, the values of effectiveness and privacy need 
to be carefully balanced in digital public health measures. 
For example, while infringements on individual rights or lib-
erties could be justified to secure health benefits, measures 
always need to be proportionate and aim for careful balance 
between competing values and considerations.
Population uptake
Effectiveness does not only presuppose a favourable con-
text in terms of a suitable pandemic stage and accompany-
ing interventions, but also sufficient uptake. For CT apps to 
offer a meaningful contribution to pandemic management, 
a large part of the population needs access to compatible 
mobile technologies (e.g. newer smartphones or beacons), 
install and set up the app, and be willing and able to use 
tools correctly.
A study from the UK has estimated that to stop the pan-
demic on its own, around 80% of smartphone users (more 
than 50% of population overall) would have to use a CT app 
(Hinch et al. 2020), i.e. a user rate comparable to What-
sApp or Facebook Messenger in some European countries. 
As mentioned, so far the highest penetration rate of CT apps 
in the world has been reported from Iceland, where almost 
40% of the overall population downloaded a CT app. For 
Singapore’s much heralded CT app, less than a quarter of the 
population are using this tool (TraceTogether 2020). At the 
point of writing in early August 2020 Germany had intro-
duced a CT app less than two months ago, and download 
numbers had reached more than 16 million, approximately 
20% of the overall population (Robert Koch Institut 2020). A 
lower adoption rate still has some positive effect for targeted 
testing and quarantine (Howell O’Neill 2020; Hinch et al. 
2020). Nevertheless, population uptake is a bottleneck for 
success of these digital technologies.
Predicting future uptake of CT apps is difficult and 
depends on various factors, such as the penetration range 
rate of digital technologies in a society, the possibility to 
download and use the app on different types of smartphones, 
the credibility of institutions offering these solutions, and 
viable solutions for ethical concerns such as data security. 
Recent surveys have been inconclusive about the possible 
uptake in different countries. A study showed a high level 
of support (around 80%) for CT apps in countries such as 
the UK, Germany, France and the US (Milsom et al. 2020), 
while other surveys from the US and Germany came to a less 
optimistic conclusion (Anderson and Auxier 2020; COVID-
19 Snapshot Monitoring 2020). The available data also show 
that some aspects could reduce the acceptability of CT apps: 
these include concerns about further continuation of surveil-
lance after the pandemic and data security (Anderson and 
Auxier 2020).
One way to increase uptake is, of course, to force people 
to download and use CT apps. Mandatory use of disease 
surveillance tools and possible moral obligations to com-
ply with them are being discussed (Lucivero et al. 2020; 
Parker et al. 2020; Schaefer and Ballantyne 2020). Coercion, 
however, adds ethical downsides of liberty restrictions that 
are seen as substantial in a liberal democratic context, and 
thereby complicates the justification of a CT app policy. 
Moreover, compulsory measures may undermine public trust 
and create incentives for cheating (Floridi 2020), necessitat-
ing even more forceful steps to secure the benefits of the 
policy. As a consequence, then these benefits need to be even 
more pronounced and certified in order to create a potential 
for the policy to be proportional.
For this reason, CT app programs based on voluntary 
use with a good uptake appear preferable. But this assumes 
strong public trust in the apps and the program (Ienca and 
Vayena 2020; Parker et al. 2020). Trust, however, must 
build on trustworthiness, and thus needs to be backed up by 
responsible design and corresponding policies. Such “well 
founded” credence (Parker et al. 2020) also remains a strong 
indicator that choices are self-determined and, thus, in line 
with democratic values.
Meanwhile, reports from China and other nations have 
already shown that digital measures utilised in the Covid-
19 pandemic response have been used for mass surveillance 
(Woodhams 2020; Human Rights Watch 2020) and that 
there might be plans to massively extend the use of newly 
established apps even after pandemic (Davidson 2020). 
In some countries such as Sweden or the Netherlands, the 
launch of CT apps has been postponed or even cancelled due 
to weak data security and doubts about effectiveness and 
291Digital contact tracing and exposure notification: ethical guidance for trustworthy pandemic…
1 3
concerns on the legality of apps that process sensitive per-
sonal information (Wassens 2020; Hagberg 2020). Such evi-
dence might have already fuelled public mistrust in CT apps 
in other nations, especially in societies, in which trust in sci-
ence and governance is limited. For countries like Germany, 
public outreach by the political representation regarding the 
introduction of different apps has created confusion (Barker 
2020). Internationally, CT apps have already become the 
subject of conspiracy theories, fake news, and scams.
From the perspective of liberal values, citizens should 
ideally support CT apps because they have (justified) faith in 
public health measures and, thus, freely choose to utilise dis-
ease surveillance technologies. This, however, does not rule 
out some measures to increase population uptake (Floridi 
2020): encouragement, campaigning, nudges and even some 
stronger forms of incentives could be justified to increase 
adoption rates. Possible benefits should be equally accessi-
ble for most citizens without disproportionate burdens, and 
negative incentives must not be so severe as to render CT 
apps de facto compulsory, for example by limiting access to 
essential infrastructures (Lucivero et al. 2020; Morley et al. 
2020). Incentives can also create new risks, e.g. owing to 
users’ psychological responses to the information regarding 
user-surroundings and related health risks disclosed by a 
particular app. A privacy infringing, unfair or burdensome 
app may trigger negative responses, particularly if it is per-
ceived as being imposed upon the public.
Public trust
Uptake depends in part on the level of trust in agencies 
responsible for development, marketing, and distribution of 
CT apps, on solving issues e.g. of data protection or stig-
matization, but also on the usefulness and performance of 
digital proximity tracing itself. Since using CT apps could 
have adverse consequences for individuals, for example 
by requiring tests and imposing isolation measures, dem-
onstrated effectiveness and validity of CT apps will be a 
major factor for population uptake. Trust, however, cannot 
be quickly established, or specifically for just one public 
health intervention (Ward 2017). It is a long-term endeav-
our and requires constant efforts to uphold it, e.g. through 
transparent communication and participatory elements in 
health care planning.
This raises a pragmatic dilemma regarding the factor of 
trust: on the one hand, the effectiveness of CT apps is uncer-
tain. On the other hand, digital proximity tracing essentially 
depends on population uptake and user adherence. Broad 
scepticism about the effectiveness of digital contract tracing 
could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This pragmatic dilemma must therefore also be incor-
porated into ethical considerations. For if the probability 
of uptake and thus of effective pandemic control with the 
app is too small, the risks and moral costs of the app could 
be too high. For an ethically appropriate introduction of an 
app, that also maintains or increases well-founded trust, the 
functions, goals, possible chances, and risks associated with 
specific CT apps must be communicated clearly, as well as 
the measures taken to mitigate the risks. The same goes for 
disclosure of conflicts of interest and the procedural manage-
ment of state-business relationships linked to commissions 
of technological development and procurement of technical 
products.
This last aspect becomes especially important if the deci-
sion is to adopt one particular national CT app solution and 
policy, meaning that private developers will be in serious 
competition to win the race for a state contract. To increase 
app uptake, focusing efforts on one single CT app with just 
one (or a limited number of) clearly defined purpose(s) and 
broad support from political and health institutions may be 
crucial. To prevent confusion and loss of trustworthiness, 
there may then be good reasons to restrict privately offered 
CT apps, or to institute mandatory quality assurance authori-
sation in order to ensure that pandemic management is not 
undermined by business ventures.
The importance of trustworthiness of technologies and 
policies for earning sustainable public trust also means that 
it is important to prevent false expectations. For instance, 
simplistic “solutionism”, i.e. the belief that pandemic chal-
lenges could be managed by technological fixes alone, must 
be avoided.
Public decision-making on pandemic policies including 
decision making on CT apps, requires a structured frame-
work to work through these ethical considerations. Such a 
framework can play a vital role in increasing transparency of 
made decisions, as well as the trustworthiness of (and trust 
in) policies and technical solutions.
Conclusion
Based on our analysis, we conclude the following points for 
consideration:
• The Covid-19 pandemic cannot be solved by techno-
logical means alone. Digital proximity tracing is not a 
panacea in the Covid-19 pandemic response, but could 
become a valuable component in a comprehensive strat-
egy. Thus, it is imperative to have appropriate public 
health measures and infrastructures in place before and 
while implementing CT apps.
• To ensure effectiveness and user-friendliness, there 
should only be a limited number of CT apps or, ideally, 
only one platform. Reducing the functionality of apps, 
i.e. only one clear objective per app, seems advisable. 
While a joint, pan-European platform, allowing interop-
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erability between different CT apps is warranted, diverg-
ing requirements need to be considered.
• Given the inevitable risks for privacy and the poten-
tial impact on individual liberty, especially related to 
the centralized CT apps, there should be a reasonable 
expectation of population benefit of CT apps prior to 
their large-scale applications. Effectiveness and benefits 
must be evaluated alongside the implementation.
• The ubiquitous presence of risks necessitates a thorough 
and prudent approach. A particular focus on temporary 
measures is warranted. While science and policy have 
been confronted with deep uncertainty during the Covid-
19 pandemic, strategies must be carefully chosen, risks 
mitigated and measures reversible. Uncertainties on the 
benefits of digital CT limit the set of legitimate pandemic 
response policies and actions. Without sufficiently clear 
evidence of effectiveness, jeopardizing the rights or liber-
ties of (some parts of) the population cannot be justified.
• Trust is essential in public health decision-making in 
general, and Covid-19 CT apps in particular. Policies, 
recommendations and public health measures should be 
part of a broader endeavour to win and maintain trust 
in public health measures. Well-founded trust requires 
taking seriously the ethical complexities relating to the 
implementation of CT apps as well as being transpar-
ent about the inevitable trade-offs that are being made. 
Communicating goals and functions as well as possible 
benefits, risks, and limitations of CT apps clearly and 
early can play a crucial role in preventing squandering 
trust and misconceptions.
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